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ABSTRACT The paper examines the impact of regulatory intervention on store card
interest rates, for a panel of UK store cards. Panel data estimation methods are used in
conjunction with intervention analysis so that the impact of the investigations on store
card interest rates can be examined. Results suggest that there is a significant negative
impact on store card interest rates. The impact of macroeconomic factors and credit
card interest rates on store card interest rates are also taken into account, results indi-
cating that store cards and credit cards should be considered as competing sources of
credit.
Key Words: Store Card Industry; Competition Policy; Panel Data Estimation.
JEL classifications: E43, L44, L8.
1. Introduction
The store card industry has been a topical issue in the UK media and in policy
circles in the last few years because of the persistently high interest rates charged
on many store cards. The average store card rate in January 1994 was 27.72%
APR, and although it fell somewhat, by January 2004 it still stood at 26.92%
(Keynote, 2005). In October 2003, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) began a market
investigation into the store card industry, as set out in the UK Enterprise Act
2002.  As the OFT concluded that competition may have been restricted in the
provision of store card services, in March 2004 it referred the industry to the
Competition Commission (CC) for further investigation in two vertically related
areas; namely the provision of credit services to retailers, and the provision of
credit via store cards to consumers in the UK. In March 2005 the investigation was
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 88 C. Elliott and Y. Wei
also broadened to encompass the insurance provisions in the market.1 The CC
then had a maximum of two years to investigate the UK store card industry, and
to make recommendations as to any measures that were required to ensure
adequate competition in the industry.
Nevertheless, few studies have been written on the store card industry. This
short paper contributes to the literature by addressing the issue of the impact of
the OFT and CC investigations on the store card market. Specifically, intervention
analysis is used to examine the impact of this regulatory investigation on interest
rates charged on store card accounts, as these represent the principal price of
using a store card. In so doing, the analysis highlights the factors that determine
store card interest rates using a newly collated dataset, and offers a contribution
to the literature on the impact of regulation and the threat of regulation that
encompasses both theoretical and empirical studies.
2. Background and Previous Studies
Store cards are an important method of purchase in the UK. Many stores offer the
opportunity of purchasing goods with a store card that can be used to purchase
goods in just one or a small number of stores, typically with branches across the
UK. Otherwise, the cards work like credit cards, a monthly bill will be issued and
consumers choose whether to settle each month’s bill in total such that no interest
is incurred, or pay at least a minimum amount each month, in which case interest
must also be paid. During their most popular time, i.e. 2002, the number of store
cards held in the UK was in excess of 24 million (Euromonitor, 2008). This is in
comparison to only 11 million in 1994 (Keynote, 1999). In terms of the value of
store card sales, a similar trend applies and the figures increased from £3.69bn in
1994 to £5.13bn in 2002. However, the importance of this payment method has
declined somewhat in recent years, although it remains significant. Media
attention given to store card interest rates and the CC final recommendation that
store card interest rates be displayed more prominently are believed to have
contributed to the number of store cards held falling to under 16 million in 2006,
and the value of transactions made using store cards falling to £3.03bn in 2007
(Euromonitor, 2008).
While there are a number of papers on the marketing of store cards, there is a
notable lack of literature on the factors determining how store card interest rates
are set by the store companies in association with the card issuing companies.
Instead the economic literature has focused on consumers’ use of store cards,
namely Wright and Sparks (1999) and Lee and Kwon (2005). Consequently, it is
suggested that this paper offers a valuable contribution to the very limited store
card literature. Note that Bolt and Chakravorti (2008) provide a valuable survey
of the existing literature on payment cards, but they focus attention on debit,
credit and prepaid cards.
It is the purpose of this paper to analyse the effects of the interventions by
the OFT and CC on store card interest rates econometrically. This is done by
using intervention analysis. There are numerous examples of intervention
analysis being used in the Economics literature, for example Acutt et al. (2001),
Elliott et al. (2010), Enders and Sandler (1996) and Lloyd et al. (1998). Further, as
in Acutt et al. (2001) and Elliott et al. (2010), the current analysis contributes to
the literature examining the impact on firms’ strategies of the threat of regula-






































































 Regulatory Intervention in the UK Store Card Industry 89
interest rates when it was first announced that the industry would face an OFT
investigation in October 2003, and then also a CC investigation in April 2004.
There is then a period of uncertainty when firms do not know what will be the
recommendations of the regulator, and we are able to model changes in store
card interest rates during this period, as well as following the publication of the
CC recommendations.
There is a related literature that uses stock market event studies to estimate
the impact of events such as regulatory investigations on firms’ stock market
valuations, see Beverley (2008) for a survey. Beverley (2008) highlights a
number of papers that have been written exploring the impact of mergers and
competition policy on firms’ stock market prices. However, while there are
similarities between this literature and the intervention analysis used in the
analysis below, stock market event studies tend to focus on the impact on stock
market prices of events in the days immediately prior and after an event. This
partly reflects an assumption that capital markets process new information
rapidly. Weinberg (2007) offers a critique of such stock market event studies,
and is one of a number of recent papers, including Ashenfelter and Hosken
(2008) to instead examine the impact of mergers on prices directly. Note that
Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008) highlight the problem that stock market event
studies and direct analysis of price effects of mergers suffer from the weakness
that longer term impacts of mergers and regulatory intervention cannot be
identified. While our analysis below permits longer term impacts of the OFT
and CC investigations into the store card industry to be estimated, the trade off
is the increased risk that price (store card interest rate) changes may reflect
changes other than those associated with particular events such as regulatory
investigations and the associated decision announcements. Nevertheless,
Ashenfelter et al. (2009) highlight a need for retrospective analysis of the impact
of regulatory interventions as in the current analysis. Further, this paper offers
a retrospective analysis of an industry investigation by the OFT and CC, in
contrast to much of the recent literature which instead focuses on merger
investigations.
3. Data and Econometric Methodology
3.1 Data
We use an unbalanced panel of monthly data on UK store card interest rates from
October 1993 to February 2008.2 The store cards included in the data set are:
Creation; Debenhams; Fortnum and Mason; House of Fraser; Ikea; Jaeger; John
Lewis; Laura Ashley; Marks and Spencers; Monsoon and Selfridges. These were
chosen as the longest data series were available of all store card interest rates
published in MoneyFacts magazine since 1990. There are two different types of
store card interest rates (Storerate): the rates when consumers pay their store card
bills using direct debit (Storerate_DD) and the rates when consumers pay using
other payment methods (Storerate_OR).
As the focus of the study is to find out the impact of investigations by regula-
tory authorities, we subject the store card interest rates to intervention analysis. In
order to do so, a number of intervention dummy variables are considered. Table 1
provides summary information on these variables. Five intervention dummy






































































 90 C. Elliott and Y. Wei
Various other control variables are also expected to impact the interest rates
charged on store cards. The explanatory variables under consideration include
the Bank of England base rate (Baserate), the 3 month UK interbank lending rate
(Libor), total UK real consumer credit in £thousand millions, 1987=100 (Conscred)
and the total UK unemployment claimant count in millions (Unemp). Credit
cards can be argued to be a substitute form of credit for consumers. Store card
interest rates may then be set, acknowledging the interest rates charged on
competing credit cards. The model of competition is assumed to be a price leader-
ship model with store card issuing companies setting prices (the interest rates) in
response to those set by the leading credit card issuers. The credit card issuers are
assumed to be the market leaders, reflecting the greater use of credit cards in the
UK and consumers’ ability to use them much more widely. As such the
regressions were run including one of four credit card interest rates. Visa and
Mastercard interest rates3 of both the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS-v and RBS-m)
and Barclays (Barc-v and Barc-m) were collected, i.e. the largest and second larg-
est credit card issuers in the UK respectively, measured in terms of both the value
of transactions and the number of cards issued (Euromonitor UK Credit Cards
Industry Report, 2008). Only one of the credit card interest rates was included in
the regressions at a time, reflecting the high correlations between the four credit
card interest rates collected. The credit card interest rate adopted was lagged one
period as it is argued that there will be a short delay between the setting of credit
card interest rates and competing store cards being able to respond. Descriptive
statistics are reported in Table 2.
While there have been a large number of store cards offered in the UK, most
are operated by only a much smaller number of issuing companies. These
include: Creation; GECF; HSBC; Ikano; Lloyds TSB and Style. To control for the
issuer’s effects, we group the store cards in our data set into four; namely those
provided by Creation; GECF; HSBC and then other issuing companies. Dummy
variables G1–G3 are used in the analysis to control for the issuing company asso-
ciated with each store card in the dataset.
Group 1 (Creation): Creation; Selfridges (G1)
Group 2 (GECF): Debenhams; House of Fraser; Laura Ashley; Monsoon (G2)
Group 3 (HSBC): Marks and Spencer; John Lewis (G3)
Group 4 (other): Ikea; Jaeger; Fortnum and Mason
In addition, monthly dummy variables were considered in the analysis.
Table 1. Intervention dummy variables
Dummy Variable Dates with dummy = 1 Related Events
D1 10/2003 – 3/2004 OFT begins investigation
D2 4/2004 – 9/2005 OFT refers case to CC
D3 10/2005 – 12/2005 CC Remedies Consultation Notice issued
D4 1/2006 – 3/2006 CC Provisional Decisions



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 92 C. Elliott and Y. Wei
3.2 Econometric Methodology
In order to examine the impact of these intervention dummies on store card inter-
est rates, we specify a panel data econometric equation. The store card interest
rates for an individual firm i at time t can be expressed as follows: 
where β and γ are vectors of coefficients. Dit is a set of dummy variables to capture
the impact of investigations. x is a vector of control variables affecting store card
interest rates. The dependent variable, store card interest rates, is arguably trun-
cated, typically being between the Bank of England base rate and 100%. Conse-
quently, Ordinary Least Squares estimation methods may be unsuitable, with the
conditional mean placing inappropriate restrictions on the residuals, resulting in
biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. Hence, we first apply the two-limit
Tobit model. This model is also appropriate as we only have a sample of store
card interest rates. Store cards for inclusion were selected on the basis of the
length of data available for each store card. The use of the Tobit model is justified
if there is any doubt regarding the representativeness of the sample.
The data collected are of a panel nature based on individual store cards. We
employ a fixed effects model to explore the cross-sectional variation between
different store cards. ε is the error term which is assumed to follow a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance σ2
ε. However, as pointed out by Arab-
mazer and Schmidt (1982), Tobit estimators are not consistent in the presence of
heteroscedasticity and/or non-normality. A likelihood ratio test and Pagan and
Vella (1989)’s conditional moment tests hence are used to detect whether errors
are homoscedastic or follow a normal distribution, respectively.
Before presenting the empirical results, it is in order to mention two technical
notes regarding the estimation of the model and the use of variables. Firstly, as
part of the data analysis the order of integration of variables is examined in order
to avoid possible spurious regression problems. For the macro variables and
credit card interest rates, because they are time-series data, the Phillips-Perron
unit root test is used. Given the short data span and the limited data variability of
the store card interest rates, the panel unit root tests advocated by Maddala and
Wu (MW) (1999) are employed for these data. Panel unit root tests provide
additional power by combining the cross-section and time series data allowing
for the heterogeneity across cross-sections. MW panel data unit-root tests
confirmed that the store card interest rate series were I(1) (see Table 2). Table 2
also reports the results of the time series Phillips-Perron unit root tests which
indicate a mix of I(1) and I(0) variables. Given this, panel cointegration tests are
then performed for each set of time-series and panel data variables in the regres-
sion. It is possible for the variables to be integrated of different orders and still to
be cointegrated (Charemza and Deadman, 1997: 126).
Pedroni (1999, 2004) employs two sets of tests for cointegration: one set is
based on the within dimension approach (i.e. panel cointegration statistics) and
the other is based on the between dimension approach (i.e. group mean panel
cointegration statistics). The within-dimension-based statistics takes into account
common time factors and heterogeneity across store cards. The between-
dimension-based statistics are based on averages of the individual autoregressive
coefficients associated with the unit root tests of the residuals for each store card






































































 Regulatory Intervention in the UK Store Card Industry 93
in the panel. In other words, between-dimension-based statistics are just the
group mean approach extensions of the within-dimension-based ones. In this
study, we use both the panel ρ-statistic (a within-dimension-based statistic) which
is an extension of the non-parametric Phillips-Perron ρ-statistic, and the group ρ-
statistic (a between-dimension-based statistic). Gutierrez (2002) has found out
that group ρ-statistic has the best power among the test statistics of Pedroni
(1999), Larsson et al. (2001) and Kao (1999).
4. Results
4.1 Results Discussion
Table 3 reports the results when direct debit interest rates of store cards are used
as the dependent variable and the Royal Bank of Scotland Visa rate is used to
measure the credit card interest rate. Specification (I) is the result for the panel
data Tobit model.
Before proceeding to the estimated results, we first examine the panel cointe-
gration test results. As panel and group ρ-statistics are all statistically significant
at the 1% level, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected. Having
established that the variables of a time series nature are cointegrated, we proceed
to estimate all variables in levels.
As argued above, Tobit regressions are not robust to departures from
homoskedasticity and normality. Statistical tests are therefore examined. As none
of the likelihood ratio test statistics are statistically significant, this indicates that
the claim that errors are heteroscedastic can be rejected. This result was expected
as firms are grouped by issuing companies. However, the Pagan and Vella
statistic strongly rejects the normality claim for the errors. Therefore, different
distributions are considered including Weibull, Logistic, Inverse Gauss and
Gamma distributions. Nevertheless, these models provide similar estimation
results to the Tobit model.
Turning to the explanatory variables, results in Table 3 indicate that, store
card interest rates are partly determined by macroeconomic factors, with the
coefficients on each of these explanatory variables having the expected signs. A
very robust result is that the Bank of England base rate and the numbers of
unemployed have significant impacts on store card interest rates, but that the
amount of consumer credit in the economy does not. In addition, lagged credit
card interest rates impact significantly upon store card rates, regardless of the
measure used.4 The CC final report into the UK store card industry concludes that 
[…] credit cards did not provide competitive constraints on store card
APRs sufficient for us to consider them to be in the same market.
(Competition Commission Store cards market investigation, Final Report,
2006: 81)
However, the statistical analysis above indicates that store card interest rates are
positively and significantly related to credit card interest rates. This challenges
the CC’s conclusion that store cards and credit cards can be considered as distinct
markets, instead potentially supporting the evidence provided to the CC by both






































































 94 C. Elliott and Y. Wei
Crucially, the coefficients associated with the intervention dummy variables
D2, D3, D4 and D5 are all negative, and significantly different from zero. This
implies that store card interest rates fell in response to key stages of the
regulatory investigation and intervention by the OFT and the CC, and even
before the final report was published. Interestingly, the coefficient on D1 is not
Table 3. Intervention analysis: panel data models
Dependent variable = Direct Debit Interest Rates of Store Cards
Explanatory variables Tobit Weibull Logistic Inverse Gauss Gamma
D1 −0.316 −0.345 −0.290 −0.398 −0.312
(0.336) (0.464) (0.384) (0.467) (0.531)
D2 −1.637*** −2.371*** −1.009*** −1.829*** −1.702***
(0.223) (0.281) (0.245) (0.249) (0.369)
D3 −2.911*** −4.434*** −1.653*** −3.615*** −3.058***
(0.446) (0.328) (0.378) (0.320) (0.402)
D4 −3.496*** −4.979*** −2.154*** −4.240*** −3.696***
(0.459) (0.368) (0.343) (0.333) (0.389)
D5 −3.827*** −5.341*** −2.577*** −4.759*** −4.032***
(0.225) (0.249) (0.209) (0.229) (0.274)
Baserate 0.236** 0.189 0.226** 0.191* 0.237*
(0.111) (0.120) (0.107) (0.116) (0.138)
Conscred 0.039 0.096 −0.005 0.114 0.039
(0.139) (0.142) (0.134) (0.142) (0.168)
Unemp −1.298*** −1.318*** −1.295*** −1.199*** −1.298***
(0.372) (0.402) (0.357) (0.383) (0.475)
Lagged RBS-v 0.207*** 0.244*** 0.172*** 0.168*** 0.212***
(0.049) (0.051) (0.042) (0.046) (0.054)
G1 4.230*** 7.738*** 2.108*** 4.306*** 4.460***
(0.265) (0.276) (0.289) (0.238) (0.320)
G2 3.684*** 7.323*** 2.293*** 4.324*** 3.930***
(0.275) (0.265) (0.263) (0.221) (0.301)
G3 −8.749*** −5.124*** −10.759*** −8.537*** −8.504***
(0.301) (0.349) (0.303) (0.671) (0.411)
Sigma 2.436*** 0.229*** 0.122*** 0.780*** 2.787
(0.041) (0.006) (0.003) (0.028) (2.783)
Theta 113.606
(229.970)
Firm fixed effects included included included included included
Model fitness test statistic 2515.95*** 2931.30*** 2703.56*** 2710.58*** 2486.28***
Joint test of the regulatory 
dummies
328.929*** 483.372*** 177.288*** 28.009*** 337.909***
D1-D5
Test of heteroscedasticity 0.998
Test of normality 734.25***
Panel Data Cointegration Tests
Panel ρ-statistic −8.28***
Group ρ-statistic −9.86***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels






































































 Regulatory Intervention in the UK Store Card Industry 95
significantly different from zero, indicating that the start of the OFT investiga-
tion did not affect store card interest rates, although the decision to refer the
investigation to the CC for more detailed analysis did have a significant,
negative impact on store card interest rates. Further, the coefficients on D3, D4
and D5 indicate an increasing impact of the regulatory intervention. This
indicates interest rates fell immediately after the CC issued the remedies
consultation notice, then they fell again during each stage of the CC’s provi-
sional decisions being made and the CC’s final report publication. Towards the
end of the OFT and CC investigations into the store card industry, the impact
of this regulatory intervention has been to reduce store card interest rates by
approximately 4%, as indicated by the magnitude of the negative coefficients
on the intervention dummy variables.
The coefficients on the group dummy variables indicate that there are signifi-
cant differences in the interest rates set on store cards issued by different issuing
companies. GECF is identified in the CC ‘Store cards market investigation’ final
report as controlling a ‘substantial part of the market’, and as expected, the store
cards issued by this company are significantly higher.
4.2 Robustness of Results
A number of changes to the methodology adopted were introduced to test further
the robustness of the results discussed above.5 
• The analysis was repeated including monthly dummy variables. However, the
coefficients on these additional explanatory variables were never significantly
different from zero, while their presence had little impact on the results
reported above, so they were not included in the final regression analysis.
• The results reported use data on the interest rates that the store cards charge
customers who settle their accounts by direct debit. Data was also collected on
store card interest rates for customers who do not pay using direct debit. These
‘other’ interest rates are a little different, and the use of these data do not affect
any of the results reported above.
• The estimations were repeated, each time using another credit card interest
rate, namely RBS’s Mastercard and the Visa and Mastercards issued by
Barclays. Again, the results of using these ‘other’ rates are qualitatively similar
to those of using RBS’s Visa rates.
• Given the state of flux in financial markets in many countries including the UK
since the summer of 2007, it is suggested that the Bank of England base rate has
not always since this time represented an accurate reflection of the cost to
financial firms of obtaining credit themselves. As such, the analysis was
repeated using the three month UK interbank lending rate (Libor) in place of
the Bank of England base rate, but again there was little change to the results
reported.
• Econometric estimation was repeated using the current, rather than lagged,
credit card interest rates (each of the RBS and Barclaycard Visa and Mastercard
rates) as the impact of changes in credit card interest rates on store card interest
rates would be assumed to be very rapid under the efficient markets hypothe-
sis. Again, there was little change to the results. Similarly, the analysis was
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5. Conclusions
The late Professor Paul Geroski, former Chairman of the Competition Commis-
sion, in his address inaugurating the new Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) at
the University of East Anglia, asked ‘Is Competition Policy worth it?’ and when
discussing the store card industry he was only able to offer some anecdotal
evidence to confirm the impact of the regulatory intervention in the UK store card
industry in the early 2000s by the Office of Fair Trading, and then The Competi-
tion Commission (Geroski, 2004). This paper uses panel data Tobit regression
methods, coupled with intervention analysis to evaluate empirically the impact of
intervention. Results indicate that regulatory intervention has had a significant
negative effect on store card interest rates, with an increasing impact during the
period of the CC’s intervention. Other factors are also identified as having signifi-
cant effects on store card interest rates. One such factor is credit card interest
rates, but in so doing the CC’s conclusion of the separability of the UK store card
and credit card markets is called into question.
It is interesting to note the impact on the store card industry of the final CC
industry recommendations. The final CC report included the recommendation
that greater prominence is given both in stores and on monthly statements to the
interest rates charged on store cards. This, coupled with increased media atten-
tion to store card interest rates has given rise to a considerable shrinking in the
store card market. While in 2002 there were 139.8 million transactions undertaken
in the UK using store cards, with a value of £5,113.0 million, these figures have
fallen in every year since, and in 2007 there were only 61.1 million store card
transactions undertaken with a value of £3,029.4 million (Euromonitor, 2008). The
store card market can be compared with the credit card market which has enjoyed
a growth in the number of credit card transactions in the UK from 1,647.2 million
in 2002 to 1,837.9 million in 2007, with the value of transactions increasing during
this time from £96,353.0 million to £114,856.5 million (Euromonitor UK Credit
Card Industry Report, 2008). This change in consumers’ use of credit and store
cards in the UK reflects not just a greater unwillingness on the part of consumers
to use store cards, but in the final CC report on the store card market, substantial
evidence is offered that indicates that numerous stores themselves have moved
away from offering store cards in favour of offering credit card provision. Hence,
the impact of the CC investigation and final recommendations extends beyond
the significant negative impact on store card interest rates that the analysis in this
paper has identified of approximately 4%.
Notes
1. This will not be the focus of the current paper.
2. See Appendix 1 for details.
3. Excluding special offer interest rates.
4. Results are not reported for the sake of brevity but available on request.
5. All of the results mentioned below are available on request.
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